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Abstract
In a self-confirming equilibrium, each player correctly forecasts the actions that opponents
will take along the equilibrium path, but may be mistaken about the way that opponents
would respond to deviations.  This paper develops a refinement of self-confirming
equilibrium in which players use information about opponents’ payoffs in forming beliefs
about the way that opponents play off of the equilibrium path.   We show that this concept
is robust to payoff uncertainty.  We also discuss its relationship to other concepts, and
show that it is closely related to assuming almost common certainty of payoffs in an
epistemic model with independent beliefs.  Journal of Economic Literature Classification
Numbers C72, D84.2
1. Introduction
Suppose, as is now common, that we interpret equilibrium in a game as a steady
state of some non-equilibrium process of adjustment and “learning.” What steady states
might we expect to observe, and conversely what strategy profiles seem unlikely to be
steady states? The notion of self-confirming equilibrium is designed to model steady states
where players have no a priori information about opponents’ play or payoffs, and each
time the game is played they observe only the actions played by their opponents.
Intuitively, self-confirming equilibrium requires only that players correctly forecast the
actions opponents will take along the equilibrium path, but does not require that their off-
path beliefs are correct.  When the only information players have is the observed play in
the game, they will never receive evidence that their forecasts of off-path play are
incorrect.  We expect, then, that any self-confirming equilibrium can be a steady state,
including those with outcomes that cannot arise in Nash equilibrium.
3
Because self-confirming equilibrium (henceforth “SCE”) allows beliefs about off-
path play to be completely arbitrary, it does not force the beliefs to incorporate restrictions
that players might be able to deduce from information about opponents’ payoff functions.
That is, it supposes that players do not “think strategically,” but simply learn from their
experience.  Of course, if players have no information about their opponents’ preferences,
they are unable to deduce that the opponents like certain actions more than others, and
there is no reason to restrict beliefs about off-path play.  This may be a good
approximation of some real-world situations, and is also the obvious way to model play in
experiments in which subjects are given no information about opponents’ payoffs.  In
                                                
3 Fudenberg and Kreps [10] and Fudenberg and Levine [14].3
other cases, both in the real world and in the laboratory, it seems plausible that players
have and use some information about their opponents’ payoffs.
4
The goal of this paper is to develop a more restrictive version of SCE that captures
how players’ deductions, based on commonly known information about all the payoffs in
the game, can restrict the set of observed long-run outcomes.  We provide some formal
results to verify the robustness of our solution concept to certain perturbations, and to
help relate our contribution to past work, but these results are not the main point of the
paper.  Rather, the paper’s main contribution is the development of the “rationalizable
self-confirming” concept, and the illustration of its implications in a number of examples.
The key issue is how to incorporate the information about payoffs into SCE.  We
suppose that players believe that their opponents’ actions will maximize their presumed
payoff functions so long as the opponents have not been observed to deviate from
anticipated play.  However, players do not use the prior payoff information to restrict
their beliefs about the play of opponents who have already been observed to deviate from
expected play.  Intuitively, this corresponds to players supposing that such deviations are
signals that the deviator’s payoff function is different than had been expected.  More
formally, we require that a player’s strategy be optimal at all of his information sets that
are not precluded by the strategy itself; we call these reachable information sets.
5
                                                
4 In many experiments subjects are told the rules that determine their opponents’ money payoffs.  The
extent to which this approximates common knowledge of payoffs depends on the extent to which
opponents are believed to be motivated by non-pecuniary factors such as altruism or spite.  In some
experiments, there is evidence that a substantial fraction of subjects are motivated by non-pecuniary
factors.  But there is also experimental evidence that some players successfully apply concepts such as
iterated dominance to anticipate opponents play; see, for example, Costa-Gomez, Crawford and Bruseta
[10].  However, there is substantially more scope for the experimental study of the impact of information
about other players’ payoffs.  This paper suggests the hypothesis that without payoff information we
should expect to see an SCE, but with the additional information, we should see only RSCE.
5 There are two closely related notions of optimality at off-path information sets that we consider: best
replies to the limit of a sequence of trembles, namely sequential rationality, as in Kreps and Wilson [21],
and best replies to the sequence itself, as in Selten’s [31] notion of trembling-hand perfection.  We expect
that, as in the relationship between sequential and perfect equilibrium, the difference is only in non-
generic games—see Kreps and Wilson [17] and Blume and Zame [6]—but verifying this takes us too far
afield.  In this introduction we are imprecise and use optimality to refer to both notions.4
There are two related reasons that we impose optimality only at reachable off-path
information sets, rather than at all information sets.  In section 2 we show by example that
the latter requirement is not robust in the sense of Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine [11], and
in section 4 we prove that the former is robust.  In section 5 we claim that optimality at
reachable information sets follows from a natural epistemic model that assumes caution
and almost common knowledge (in the sense of Monderer and Samet [19]) of rationality.
6
Reny [21, 21], Ben Porath [3] and Gul [16], among others, also argue (in varying degrees
of specificity) for optimality at reachable nodes.
To capture the idea that play corresponds to the steady state of a learning process
in which the path is observed each time the game is played, we also assume that the path
of play is public information.  This is in the spirit of, but stronger than, the assumption
underlying self-confirming equilibrium, which is that each player knows the path of play.
For simplicity, we also impose the assumption that players’ beliefs concerning their
opponents’ play correspond to independent randomizations.  Combining these
assumptions with that of optimality at reachable nodes leads to “rationalizable self-
confirming equilibrium,” or “RSCE.”
Papers by Rubinstein and Wolinksy [23] and Greenberg [15], like ours, are based
on the idea that players form their forecasts of opponents play using both prior
information both about the opponents’ payoffs and some information about what is
observed when the game is actually played. Greenberg’s notions of null mutually
acceptable courses of action and path mutually acceptable courses of action correspond to
the non-robust “sequentially rationalizable sets” and “sequentially rationalizable self-
confirming equilibrium” that we define in section 4.  However, where we use these
concepts only as tools for understanding the RSCE concept, Greenberg uses them as the
center of his analysis.
                                                
6 The relationship between the results of sections 4 and 5 is similar to that between the results of Dekel
and Fudenberg [9] and those of Börgers [7].5
 Rubinstein and Wolinksy consider strategic-form, instead of extensive-form games
and therefore do not impose optimality at off-path information sets.  They represent the
information that players obtain about opponents’ play by arbitrary but deterministic “signal
functions” and they allow for correlated beliefs.  These differences complicate the
comparison of their work with ours, and we defer a fuller discussion to the section 5, but
roughly speaking, in the cases that are common to their work and ours, their notion of an
RCE (“rationalizable conjectural equilibrium”) corresponds to self confirming
equilibrium—the “rationalizable” aspect of their concept has no additional bite.
We should make clear from the outset that, although this paper is motivated by the
learning-theoretic approach to equilibrium in games, we do not here provide an explicit
learning-theoretic foundation for our concepts.  We are confident that such foundations
can be constructed by, for example, incorporating restrictions on the priors into the
steady-state learning model of Fudenberg and Levine [13], but we have not checked the
details.
2.  The Solution Concepts
There are n players i = 1,..., n and a game tree with decision nodes x Î X and
terminal nodes z Î Z.  Information sets for player i are hi Î Hi; singleton information sets
for nature are H0.  Available actions at an information set are A(hi).  A behavior strategy
for player i, pi Î Pi, satisfies pi(hi) Î D(A(hi)).  The payoffs are ui(z).
A profile p is said to have the same path as  $ p  if p p , $  agree on the set of
information sets reached with positive probability under p .  Call an information set hi
reachable given strategy pi if there exists a p’-i such that hi  is reached with positive
probability given (, ) p p ii ¢ - ; These represent places in the tree that are consistent with
player i playing pi.
An assessment ai for player i is a probability distribution over nodes at each of his
information sets.  A belief for player i is a pair bi º (ai, p
i
-i), consisting of i's assessment6
over nodes ai, and i's expectations of opponents’ strategies p
i
-i = (p
i
j)j¹i.
7  W e  s h ou l d
emphasize that the assumption that player i’s expectations about his opponents’ play
corresponds to a strategy profile incorporates the implicit restriction that opponents
randomize independently.
8,9
The belief ba ii i
i º - (, ) p  is consistent (Kreps and Wilson [17]) if ai =limni
n a ®¥ ,
where the ai
n are obtained using Bayes rule from a sequence of strictly positive strategy
profiles of the opponents, pp -- ® i
im
i
, .  Throughout this paper we are only concerned with
consistent beliefs; at times we will refer to the sequence p -i
im ,  as the one that makes bi
consistent.
Given a consistent belief bi  by player i, player i’s information sets give rise to a
decision tree, and for each information set hi there is a well-defined sub-tree beginning
with that information set.  A behavior strategy pi is a best response at hi by a player i to
consistent beliefs bi if the restriction of pi to the subtree starting at hi is optimal in that
sub-tree.  (Thus a best response at hi  supposes that the player will play optimally at
subsequent nodes as well.) It is useful to define a version of player i, n i, as a strategy-
belief pair n p ii i b = (,) .  Our main solution concepts identify a belief model,
VV V n = (, ,) 1 K , that specifies a set of versions Vi for each player i.
We begin by reviewing the notion of self-confirming equilibrium and restating it in
a way that is similar to our main notion.
10
                                                
7 Note that what we call an “assessment” is what Kreps and Wilson [17] call a “system of beliefs for
player i,” and that our “belief” is similar to what they call an “assessment.” The reason we have switched
terminology is that, unlike Kreps and Wilson, we consider strategic uncertainty; as reflected in the fact
each player i makes his own forecast p
i
-, where we do not impose pp k
i
k
j =  for ij ¹ .  Thus in place of a
single commonly known object (,) a p  we have distinct “beliefs” bi º (ai, p
i
-i ).
8 See Fudenberg and Kreps [10] for a discussion of this point.
9 Given independence, Kuhn’s theorem [18] shows that there is no additional loss of generality in
restricting attention to expectations that correspond to a single strategy profile p -i
i , as opposed to a
probability distribution over such profiles.
10 In definition 2.1 every strategy-belief pair in the belief model is required to be consistent with the
overall path of play, so there is a single belief about the path of play for each player i; this is called
“unitary” self confirming in Fudenberg and Levine [12].  The alternative, “heterogeneous,” version of7
Definition 2.1: Profile  $ p  is a self-confirming
11 equilibrium (SCE) if there is a singleton
belief model Vb b nn ={( , )},...,{( , )} p p 11  such that, for all players i
1. For every (pi, bi) Î Vi, pi is a best response to bi = (ai, p -i
i ) at information sets that are
reached with positive probability under (pi, p -i
i ).
2. Every (pi, bi) Î Vi has the distribution over outcomes induced by  $ p .
In this case we refer to  $ p  as a self-confirming equilibrium and the distribution over
outcomes induced by  $ p  as a self-confirming outcome.
The other notions we develop all incorporate a “belief-closed” requirement, in the
spirit of rationalizability.  As in rationalizability, this requirement is intended to ensure that
the strategies that player i expects player j to play could actually make sense for j to play,
in the sense of being consistent with what i knows about j’s payoffs.
Definition 2.2: A belief model V is belief-closed if for every (, (, ) ) p p ii i
i
i aV - Î , p
i
j can be
generated by a mixture over strategies in the set { ’ |( ’ ,) } p p jj j j j bV b Î  for some belief  .
12
In words, i’s beliefs about j must be consistent with the set of j's possible versions.  Thus,
the elements of the sets Vj are better viewed as “versions that player i might think player j
is” than as “versions that j is likely to be.” For example, if n j’s strategy specifies an action
at some off-path information set that is not optimal given j’s  specified payoffs, the
interpretation is that this is something i plausibly thinks that j would do if that information
set is reached.  As we will argue below, such beliefs can be plausible because the fact that
                                                                                                                                               
self-confirming equilibrium only requires that (,) p ii b  be consistent with the outcomes player i observes
when playing pi.  Although heterogeneous beliefs are very important for describing some experimental
outcomes, developing a “rationalizable” version of heterogeneous SCE for general games involves a
number of subtleties that are beyond the scope of this paper.
11 More precisely, this is “independent unitary” self-confirming equilibrium.  Since this is the primary
notion we study in this paper, we omit the terms “independent unitary.”
12 A behavior strategy p j  is generated by a mixture  (, ) aa 1-  over p j’ and p j’’ if for every p - j , the
distribution over terminal nodes induced by (, ) p p jj -  equals the  (, ) aa 1-  mixture over the
distributions induced by (’ , ) p p jj -  and ( ’’, ) p p jj -  respectively.8
the off-path information set was reached can lead player i to revise his beliefs about j’s
payoffs.
To clarify that this condition is not driving any of the distinctions between self-
confirming equilibria and our main solution concept we show that there is no loss of
generality in adding the belief closed condition to the notion of self-confirming
equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1: Profile  $ p  is a self-confirming equilibrium if and only if there is a belief
model V such that, for all players i,
 1. For every (,) p ii i bV Î , pi is a best response to bi = (ai, p -i
i ) at information sets that
are reached with positive probability under (, ) p p ii
i
- .
2. Every (pi, bi) Î Vi has the distribution over outcomes induced by  $ p .
3. V is belief closed.
One direction of this result is obvious: If conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold, we may pick
any point (pi, bi) from each set Vi and Definition 2.1 will be satisfied.  The converse is not
quite as easy, as singleton sets satisfying 1 and 2 need not be belief closed.  For example,
player 1 might believe that player 2’s off-path play is L, while 2’s strategy specified that 2
plays R.  However, the weak optimality condition 1 does not restrict off-path play, so in
this case we could add a new element to V2 corresponding to player 1’s beliefs about
player 2’s play.  Of course, condition 1 does restrict play along the equilibrium path, but
condition 2 ensures that beliefs about on-path play are correct.  A formal proof along
these lines is straightforward, and we omit it.
1 2 R L
u
d
(3,1)
(0,0)
(2,2)
Figure 2.19
SCE imposes optimality only at information sets that are reached.  Intuitively, this
corresponds to the idea that the players learn the path of play but have no information
about their opponents’ payoffs.  For example, in the game of Figure 2.1 above, SCE
allows 2 to play d so long as 2’s information set is not reached in the course of play.  As
noted by Selten [24], player 2 can “threaten” to play d, and thus induce 1 to play L.
However, this threat is not “credible” if 1 knows 2’s payoff function, for then player 1
should realize that player 2 would play u if ever her information set is reached.  For this
reason, in many settings the weak rationality condition used by Nash and self-confirming
equilibrium incorporates too little information about opponents’ payoffs.
Thus, our first step towards introducing a theory in which players make use of
information about each others payoffs is to introduce a notion of rationalizability that
strengthens the optimality condition, condition 1, to require that player i’s strategy be
optimal not only along the path of play, but at all information sets that are not precluded
by that strategy.
Definition 2.4: A belief model, V, is rationalizable at reachable nodes if for all i:
1'. For every (,) p ii i bV Î , pi is a best response to bi = (ai, p
i
-i) at information sets reachable
under pi.
3.    V is belief closed.
Definition 2.5: Profile  $ p  is a rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE) if there
is a belief model V that is rationalizable at reachable nodes, and such that, for all i
2.   Every (pi, bi) Î Vi has the distribution over outcomes induced by  $ p .
Turning back to the game in Figure 2.1, we see that the RSCE notions capture
what we wanted: L is not part of any beliefs that are rationalizable at reachable nodes.  To
see this, observe that 2’s information set is always reachable, so condition 1’ implies that
the only strategy in V2 is u.  From condition 3, player 1 must believe this, and so he plays10
R.  An important feature of RSCE is that a strategy need not be optimal at information
sets that the strategy itself precludes.  The reason that we do not wish to impose
optimality at such information sets is that this stronger requirement is not robust to the
presence of a small amount of payoff uncertainty.  To see this, consider the game in Figure
2.2.
1 2 1’ (1,1)
(2,2)
(0,0)
(0,1)
U
D
r
d
R L
Figure 2.2
In this game the outcome L occurs in the Nash equilibrium (LD,d), but not in any
subgame-perfect equilibrium.  However in the game of incomplete information in Figure
2.3,
1 2 1’ (1,1)
(2,2)
(0,0)
(0,1)
U
D
r
d
R L
1 2 1’ (1,1)
(2,2)
(4,0)
(4,1)
U
D
r
d
R L
N 2
e
1-e
Figure 2.311
where payoffs are very likely to be as in Figure 2.2, the outcome L occurs in a sequential
equilibrium.  So requiring optimality at all information sets rules out the outcome L in
Figure 2.2 but not in 2.3; hence this requirement is robust to small payoff uncertainties.
13
It is easy to see that by construction RSCE achieves our objectives in Figure 2.2: since
player 1’s second information set is not reachable when 1 plays L, the outcome L can
occur in a RSCE.  In section 4 we explore the relationship between RSCE and solution
concepts that impose optimality at all information sets.
3. Examples
This section contains some examples that clarify the concepts defined in the
preceding section.
Example 3.1: Ordinary self-confirming equilibrium allows two players to disagree about
the play of the third.  This example demonstrates the intuitive idea that the possibilities for
such disagreements are reduced when players must believe that opponent’s play is a best
response at reachable nodes.  Consider the following version of the extensive-form game
Fudenberg and Kreps [10] used to show that mistakes about off-path play can lead to non-
Nash outcomes:
                                                
13 Just as in previous work related to this notion of robustness, one may be able to identify a smaller set of
robust predictions if one feels confident that certain forms of payoff uncertainty are much less likely than
others.  (We ourselves have no such confidence; we note the point because it is often raised in seminars.)12
1 2
3
A
D d
(1,1,1)
(3,0,0) (0,3,x) (3,0,0) (0,3,y)
L R L R
a
Figure 3.1
Here the outcome (A, a) is self-confirming for any values of x and y.  It is supported by
player 1 believing that player 3 will play R and player 2 believing that player 3 will play L.
However, because 3’s information set is reachable, this outcome is not RSCE if both x and
y have the same sign: If x, y > 0 then players 1 and 2 forecast that 3 will play R, and so 2
plays d; if x, y < 0 then 3 plays L so 1 plays D.  However, if x and y have opposite signs,
then (A, a) is a RSCE outcome, since players 1 and 2 are not required to have the same
beliefs about player 3’s off-path assessment of the relative probability of the two nodes in
her information set, and player 1 can think that 3’s assessment makes R optimal, while
player 2 can think that 3’s assessment induces her to play L.
14
Example 3.2: The next example shows that it is possible to have outcomes that are
selfconfirming and rationalizable, yet fail to be RSCE.  Thus the RSCE concept does more
than simply take the intersection of sets that satisfy its constituent assumptions.  Consider
the following extensive form game.
                                                
14  This example shows that even requiring optimality at all information sets, as in the notion of a
sequentially RSCE defined in section 4, need not be Nash.13
1 2 r
u
3
3
a
d
D
U
D
U
(0,1,0)
(1,1,1)
(0,0,0)
(2,2,2)
(4,-4,10)
Figure 3.2
In this example (u, d, U) is a self-confirming equilibrium (and even a Nash)
equilibrium) since player 2’s information set is off the equilibrium path, and so he may play
d.  Moreover the following belief model is rationalizable at reachable nodes: V1 = {(u, (d,
U)), (u, (d, D)), (r, (a, U)), (r, (a, D))}, V2 = {(a, (r, U)), (d, (r, D)), (d, (u, D)), (a, (u,
U))}, and V3 = {(U, (u, a)), (U, (u, d)), (U, (r, d)), (D, (r, a))}.  (Note that we didn't
specify assessments, only strategies: for players 1 and 2 the assessments are trivial; for
player 3 an assessment is needed only in the third element of V3.  Here we specify the
assessment that puts probability 1 on the upper node.) Thus the path (u, U) is possible
according to each set Vi.
 However, the outcome (u, U) is not rationalizable self-confirming.  Intuitively,
this is because player 1 should realize that player 2 knows that player 3 is playing up and
then deduce that player 2 will play a.  Notice that player 2’s information set is always
reachable since regardless of how player 2 plays it can be reached unilaterally by player 1.
Hence any beliefs for player 2 that satisfy (1') have optimization by player 2 at his
information set.  Moreover, the beliefs must agree with the equilibrium path, so player 2
must believe that 3 is playing U.  So all possible b2’s have player 2 playing a.  Thus p1
must be a best response to the belief b 1 in which 3 plays U (because 1 knows the14
equilibrium path) and in which 2 plays a (from our discussion of V2 and the belief-closed
condition), and so 1 must play r instead of u.
This shows that the belief-closed condition does have extra power when combined
with conditions 1’ (optimality at reachable nodes) and 2 (knowledge of the path), even
though it is vacuous when combined with conditions 1 (optimality on the path) and 2.
Example 3.3: We next consider further the fact that RSCE allows two players to disagree
about the play of a third.  Fudenberg and Levine [12] showed that in games with identified
deviators the set of (unitary) SCE is not altered by adding the requirement that players
have the same beliefs about one another.  For RSCE, which incorporates the additional
assumption of optimality at reachable nodes, this is no longer the case.  For a particularly
simple example consider the following perfect-information game.
1 L R 2
d
r 1
DD
RR 3
D
U
(5,0,0)
(10,0,0) (0,10,0)
(-100,-100,0)
(100,101,0)
Figure 3.3
We claim first that the outcome (R, d) i s RSCE.  (In what f ol l ows we do not
specify assessments, as they are trivial.) To see this, let V1 = ((R, RR), d, D), V2 = (d, (R,
RR), U) and VVV 312 =È.  Notice that these sets are consistent and all have the same
path.  Moreover condition 3 is satisfied since it only requires that if one player believes a
second is playing a particular way, there is a version of the second player who is playing
that way.  In particular, two players may disagree about the play of a third, as is the case
here.  It remains to check sequential optimality for each player.  Player 3 is indifferent, so15
is certainly playing optimally.  Finally, inspection shows that players 1 and 2 are both
playing best responses to their beliefs at each information set.
However, this outcome cannot arise in a RSCE in which player 1 and player 2
agree about the play of player 3.  With that additional requirement, an RSCE with
outcome (R, d) would need to be subgame-perfect, since given that play there are no
unreachable information sets.  To see that the outcome (R, d) is not subgame perfect, note
that any randomization by player 3 gives both player 1 or player 2 approximately the same
amount, with player 2 getting slightly more than player 1.  If the amount player 1 gets is
strictly greater than 5 then backwards induction implies (R, r, RR).  If the amount player
1 gets is strictly less than 5, and player 2 gets strictly more than 0 then backwards
induction implies either (L, r, RR) or (L, r, DD).  If the amount player 1 gets is equal to 5
then we can have any mixture of (R, r, RR) and (L, r, RR).  If the amount player 2 gets is
strictly smaller than 0 backwards induction implies (L, r, DD).  If it is equal to zero, player
1 must play DD, player 2 must play r, and so player 1 plays L.  So (R, d) cannot occur in
an RSCE when players 1 and 2 agree about the play of player 3.
This example relies on player 3 being indifferent, but that can be avoided by
replacing 3’s move with a simultaneous-move subgame between 3 and 4 that has two
strict equilibria, with payoffs for 1 and 2 as in the figure.  (This is a multi-stage game with
observed actions and hence has identified deviators.)  As in example 3.2, RSCE allows
players 1 and 2 to each expect a different Nash equilibrium in the stage game between
players 3 and 4.
15
Example 3.4: If every path through the tree hits at most one information set of every
player, then all information sets are reachable under any profile.
16  In particular, if the
game is finite and there is a unique backwards induction solution (which is true for generic
                                                
15 The same is true if RSCE is strengthened so that strategies are optimal at all information sets, as in the
notion of sequentially RSCE defined in section 4.
16 In this case rationalizability at reachable nodes coincides with its strengthening to sequential
rationalizability, which requires optimality at all information sets, as defined in section 4.16
assignments of payoff vectors to terminal nodes) then RSCE coincides with the backwards
induction solution.  This is true in particular in the game below
1 2 3 (1,1,1)
(2,2,2)
(0,0,0)
(0,1,0)
U
D
r
d
R L
Figure 3.4
Note that players 1 and 3 have the same payoff at every terminal node: this figure
is the “agent form” of the game in Figure 2.2, where player 1’s information set 1’ has been
assigned to an “agent” (player 3) with the same payoffs.  The reason RSCE makes
different predictions in these two games is that, as we show in the next section, it captures
the predictions that are robust to small amounts of incomplete information provided that
the players’ doubts about their opponents’ payoffs are not correlated.  Thus an unexpected
move by player 1 can signal that player 1’s own payoffs are different than had been
supposed, but does not change beliefs about the payoffs of other players.  We say more
about this issue of correlated payoff uncertainty below.
4.  Robustness of Rationalizable Self-Confirming Equilibrium
Implicit in our approach is the idea that rationality at reachable nodes is more likely
than at arbitrary nodes.  The underlying reasoning behind this is the idea that a player’s
own decision to deviate does not convey to him any information about other players’
rationality; while an opponent’s decision to deviate may indicate a degree of irrationality.
To provide a formal rationale for this reasoning, we are led to consider whether
equilibrium is robust, meaning that it is not changed significantly by small perturbations in17
the game that is played.  We do so using the model of elaborations proposed by
Fudenberg, Kreps and Levine [11].
An elaboration with personal types of the game consists of a finite collection Qi
of types for each player.  Letting QQ º´ ii , the game tree of the elaboration has nodes
q,x 16  and terminal nodes  q,z 16 .  There is a probability distribution m  over types Q .
Information sets in the elaboration are of the form (,) q ii h  where hi  is an information set
in the original game.  In particular (,)(,) ¢ Î q q xh ii  if and only if  ¢ = q q ii  and xh i Î , so
that each player’s own type is her private information.  Payoffs in the elaboration are
uz ii (, ) q , and so depend only on the terminal node of the original game and the player’s
type.  In the elaboration, the “normal” types q i
0 have approximately the same payoffs as in
the original game.
Let E denote the original game, and consider a sequence E
k  of elaborations.  We
say that EE
k ®  if
1.   There is a uniform bound on the number of types in Qi
k .
2.   There is a uniform bound on the utility functions ui
k .
3.   lim ( , ) ( ) ki
k
ii uz u z q
0 = .
4.   lim ( ) k
k m q
0 1 = .
17
Suppose Vi
k are a sequence of sets of versions for player i.  We say that VV i
k
i ®  if
(i) for every sequence (, (, ) ) p p i
k
i
k
i
ik a -  in Vi
k
 and every accumulation point d of the induced
sequence of distributions on terminal nodes of the original game, D i
k
i
ik (p p ,) - , there exists
some (, (, ) ) p p ii i
i a -  in Vi
k, with DD ii (p p ,) - = , and
(ii) if for every (, (, ) ) p p ii i
i a -  in Vi, the induced distribution Dd ii (p p ,) - =  is the limit of
some such sequence.
18
                                                
17 Conditions 1 and 4 together imply that as k grows the event q q =
0 becomes common p-belief for p
arbitrarily near 1.  (Fudenberg and Tirole [14], Theorem 14.5)
18 This is the notion of convergence used in Dekel and Fudenberg [9].18
Given a solution concept, we say that the solution is robust with respect to
(independent) elaborations if whenever EE
k ® , and VV
k ®  with V
k satisfying the
solution concept for the elaborated games, then V  satisfies the solution concept for the
original game.
Theorem 4.1: (a) If the belief model V  is rationalizable at reachable nodes, then it is
robust with respect to independent elaborations.
 (b) If  $ p  is a RSCE, then it is robust with respect to independent elaborations.
Remark 4.1: Theorem 4.1 does not extend to robustness to correlated elaborations.  To
see this, consider the following elaboration of the game in example 3.4 (this is essentially
the same as the elaboration of Figure 2.2 shown in Figure 2.3):
1 2 3 (1,1,1)
(2,2,2)
(0,0,0)
(0,1,0)
U
D
r
d
R L
1 2 3 (1,1,1)
(2,2,2)
(4,0,4)
(4,1,4)
U
D
r
d
R L
N 2
e
1-e
Figure 4.1
Here the outcome L can have probability close to 1 in a sequential equilibrium, and
so can certainly occur in a RSCE, yet the outcome is ruled out by RSCE in the original
game.  Theorem 4.1 shows that RSCE is robust; we now show that it is the smallest
robust concept that is at least as large as one requiring optimality at all information sets.
The following definition strengthens the notion of rationalizability at reachable nodes to all19
nodes; equivalently it weakens the notion of sequential equilibrium for extensive-form
games to the context of rationalizability.  The subsequent definition strengthens RSCE,
also by imposing optimality at all information sets.
Definition 4.1: The belief model V is sequentially rationalizable if for all players i:
1’’. If (pi, bi) Î Vi then pi is a best response to bi = (ai, p
i
-i) at all information sets.
3.  V is belief closed.
Definition 4.2: Profile  $ p  is a sequentially rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium if
there is a belief model V that is sequentially rationalizable and such that for all i:
2.  Every (pi, bi) Î Vi has the distribution over outcomes induced by  $ p .
Greenberg [15] defines more general versions of both these concepts that do not
require the game to be common knowledge.  When it is, his null MACA is equivalent to
sequential rationalizability and path MACA is equivalent to sequentially rationalizable self-
confirming equilibrium.
19
Theorem 4.2: a) If V is rationalizable at reachable nodes then there exists a sequence of
elaborations EE
k ®  and belief models V V
k ®  that are sequentially rationalizable in the
elaborations.
b) If  $ p  is RSCE , then there exists a sequence of elaborations EE
k ®  that have
sequentially RSCE p p
k ® $ .
Remark 4.2: This generalizes our discussion of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 concerning the non-
robustness of sequentially RSCE.  As in Dekel and Fudenberg [9], the proof constructs
elaborations in which each player has two types, the “normal” or “sane” type and a second
                                                
19 Greenberg does not impose common knowledge of the game because his motivation is more
encompassing than ours: He “offer[s] a way to formalize and analyze social environments in which
players may ‘live in different worlds’, but nevertheless, they often follow a ‘mutually acceptable course
of action’—each player for his own ‘rational’ reasons.  That is, each player analyzes his own extensive
form game that represents his world.” [15].20
type that is completely indifferent between all outcomes and so is willing to use whatever
“off-path” strategy that is convenient for the proof.
5.  Related Literature
Börgers [7] showed that assuming almost common knowledge of rationality and
caution yields the solution concept, SW
¥ , that Dekel and Fudenberg [9] were led to by
considerations of robustness.  (This is the set left after first eliminating weakly dominated
strategies, then applying iterated strict dominance.) Given the results in the preceding
section it is then natural to examine and confirm the relationship between an epistemic
model and RSCE.  We sketch this relationship below, omitting the formal details; see
Börgers and references therein for formal definitions of the concepts we use, such as
Monderer and Samet’s [19] notion of almost common knowledge.
 Caution means that players only use strategies that are a best reply to a full
support belief.  This rules out weakly dominated strategies, while RSCE, like sequential
equilibrium, permits some weakly dominated strategies.  Thus to obtain an equivalence
with a solution concept that satisfies almost common knowledge of caution and of
rationality we must strengthen RSCE as follows.  A belief model, V, is perfectly
rationalizable at reachable nodes if condition 1 in definition 2.4 is strengthened so that not
only is p i a best response to bi at reachable nodes, but it is also a best response to the
sequence p -i
im ,  that makes bi consistent at those information sets.  Similarly, an outcome
$ p  is a perfectly RSCE if in addition it satisfies condition 2, that the distribution induced
by the versions (pi, bi) Î Vi have the distribution over outcomes induced by  $ p .
20
                                                
20  One might wonder whether the additional requirement of perfection is robust with respect to
elaborations.  It is, if we weaken the notion of elaboration by strengthening condition 3 in the definition
above of convergence of an elaboration to require that uz u z i
k
ii (, ) ( ) q
0 =  instead of
lim ( , ) ( ) ki
k
ii uz u z q
0 = .  Without strengthening the notion of convergence, the impact of the trembles in
breaking ties can be undone by small perturbations in the payoffs.  (See Dekel and Fudenberg [9]).21
The only remaining difference between strategies in a belief model that is perfectly
rationalizable at reachable nodes and those in SW
¥  arises because Börgers allows for
correlation while we do not.  In particular, the two coincide for two-person games.  The
effect of correlation is twofold.  In example 3.4, a game of perfect information where each
player moves only once, rationalizability at reachable nodes rules out the outcome L, but
this outcome survives SW
¥ , since even after D is deleted for player 3 by weak dominance,
2’s choice of d is not strictly dominated.  Intuitively, this reflects the fact that L can be
justified by an elaboration with correlated types, so that a deviation by player 1 could
convince player 2 that player 3’s payoff function is different than had been originally
supposed.  In addition to the possibility of correlated perturbations, SW
¥  also allows
players to believe that their opponents’ play is correlated.  It is well known that allowing
for this larger set of beliefs results in different and larger solution sets.
21  Since this and
other effects of correlation are well understood, we have chosen not to develop them
formally here.  The characterization of perfectly RSCE results from adding the
requirement that the distribution over outcomes is almost common knowledge.
Rubinstein and Wolinsky [23] define a related solution concept, rationalizable
conjectural equilibrium, or RCE, for games in strategic form.  The main distinction
between RCE and this paper is our focus on the extensive form: Our model therefore
restricts behavior at (some) off-path information sets, which theirs does not.  In addition,
they allow for correlation, while we assume independence.  Finally, the papers use
different formulations of the idea that beliefs must accord with observed play: Where we
suppose that players observe terminal nodes, they allow observations to be generated by
more general “signal functions;” on the other hand, we allow players to observe
                                                
21 For example, consider the three-player game in Fudenberg and Kreps [10], where player 1 has a choice
of either playing “out” and ending the game or playing a simultaneous-move subgame with players 2 and
3.  If “out” is not a best response to any strategy profile of 2 and 3, yet “out” is a best response to a
correlated strategy, then “out” cannot be played in any self-confirming equilibrium with independent
beliefs, but it can be played if correlated beliefs are permitted.  Fudenberg and Kreps also discuss the
interpretation of correlated beliefs in the context of learning in games.22
distributions, while they consider only deterministic observations.  To best see the
relationship between their work and ours consider two-person games, to set aside the
difference due to correlation, and restrict attention to the common case where a
deterministic path is observed.  In this case their solution concept is the same as Battigali
and Guatoli’s [2] conjectural equilibrium (CE) and self-confirming equilibrium, both of
which assume only rationality rather than common certainty of rationality.  Our focus in
this paper was to add to self-confirming equilibrium (robust) elements of extensive-form
rationality, which obviously are not contained at all in Rubinstein-Wolinsky’s RCE, and a
fortiori in Battigalli and Guatoli’s CE.
To summarize we present a table relating the solution concepts discussed in this
section for the case of two-person games when deterministic paths of play in the
extensive-form are observable.
Rationality (Almost)
22
Common Certainty
of Rationality
ACC of Rationality and
Caution
No observation S S
¥ 23 S
¥W = perfectly rationalizable
at reachable nodes
24
Paths are publicly
observed.
Self confirming equilibria = CE
25
= rationalizable CE
26
Perfect RSCE
                                                
22 The parenthesis around almost are meant to indicate that in this column the result does not depend on
whether or not almost is included; subsequent columns on the right require the restriction to almost
common certainty since caution is introduced.
23 See Bernheim [4], Pearce [20], and Tan and Werlang [25].
24 See Börgers [7]
25 See Battigalli and Guatoli [2].
26 See Rubinstein and Wolinsky [23].23
Appendix
Theorem 4.1: (a) If the belief model V  is rationalizable at reachable nodes, then it is
robust with respect to independent elaborations.
 (b) If  $ p  is a RSCE, then it is robust with respect to independent elaborations.
Proof: (a) Suppose that EE
k ® , and V V
k ®  where V
k is rationalizable at reachable
nodes.  We will show that the V’s are consistent and satisfy  ¢¢ 1 .  Condition 3 is obviously
preserved in the limit.
First observe that the consistency of Vi is immediate, since we can take a
diagonalization of the sequences of full-support sequences corresponding to the Vi
k’s.  To
prove  ¢¢ 1 , suppose that (, (, ) ) p p ii i
i
i aV - Î  and p i is not a best response to (, (, ) ) p p ii i
i a -  at
some  hi  that is reachable under p i.  Since VV
k ® ,  p i is a limit point of a sequence
{p
k} with (, (, ) ) p p ii i
i
i
k aV - Î ; moreover if hi  is reachable under p i, then it is reachable
under p
k.  We claim that the conditional probability  pr h
k
ii
k (|, ) qp
0  that i is “normal” at
such an hi must converge to 1 in any sequence of consistent assessments.  Because the
game has perfect recall, if hi  is not reached under p
k but is reachable for player i, there is
no strategy for player i such that hi  is reached under p -i
k .  Consequently
pr h
k
ii
kk
i (|, ) () qpm q
00 =  ®1.  But then the fact that p i
k
i h |  is optimal in the subtree that
describes the game from hi on given beliefs bi
k  implies that p ii h |  is optimal with respect
to bi following hi, so that the property of being rationalizable at reachable nodes is robust.
b) Fix a profile  $ p  that is a RSCE or a heterogeneous RSCE, and suppose that EE
k ® .
Let VV
k ®  be sets that satisfy 1", 2, and 3.  Part (a) shows that 1" and 3 are preserved in
the limit, and it is obvious that 2 is as well.
￿24
Theorem 4.2: a) If V is rationalizable at reachable nodes then there exists a sequence of
elaborations EE
k ®  and belief models V V
k ®  that are sequentially rationalizable in the
elaborations.
b) If  $ p  is RSCE , then there exists a sequence of elaborations EE
k ®  that have
sequentially RSCE p p
k ® $ .
Proof: a) Let V  be rationalizable at reachable nodes..  We will consider elaborations E
k
in which each player has one alternative type who is completely indifferent over outcomes.
We construct Vi
k i n  t w o  s t e p s .   F i r s t ,  w e  m o d i f y  n p p ii i i
i
i aV ºÎ - (, (, ) )  so that it is
sequentially rational at all information sets in the elaborations Vi
k: the rational type’s play
is modified at all unreachable information sets so as to be sequentially rational given
ba ii i
i = - (, ) p ; the indifferent type plays p i.  This gives rise to a strategy ~ () p n i
k
i  in the
elaborated game.
We now construct the Vi
k.  Given n p p ii i i
i
i aV ºÎ - (, (, ) )  and j we can find (due to
condition 3) a probability distribution pji (| ) ×n  over Vj consistent with p -i
i .  We may also
combine the behavior strategies ~ () p n j
k
j  using the weights pjj (| ) ×n  to get behavior
strategies  p j
ik for k
th elaboration.  The set Vi
k will consist of all(, ) ai
kk p that are generated
by some n p p ii i i
i a = - (, (, ) )  in Vi, where (i) pp j
k
j
k =  for  ji ¹ , (ii) p p n i
k
i
k
i = ~ ()  and (iii) ai
k
is defined as follows.  Let p-i
n be the full support beliefs that makes the assessment ai
consistent.  Let p-i
k,n be a strategy profile for i’s opponents in the elaboration given by the
sane opponents playing their sequentially rational strategies (the ~ () p n j
k
j ) and the
indifferent types playing p-i
n.  Finally, note that while p-i
k,n does not have full support, it is
the case that against p-i
k,n every information set of i can be reached by some strategy of i,
and therefore (under perfect recall) p-i
k,n uniquely determines an assessment for i.
That the sets Vi
k are sequentially rationalizable follows immediately from their
construction.
b) Suppose now that  $ p  is RSCE.  Then there is a belief model V that is rationalizable at
reachable nodes and also satisfies condition 2 or 2’.  Construct the elaborations and the25
sets VV
k ®  as above.  Since the sane type’s play along the path of  $ p  is the same in the
elaborations as in the original game, and the indifferent type’s play in each ~ () p n i
k
i  is the
same as in the strategy p i  that generated it, the path of play is  $ p  in each of the
elaborations.  In other words conditions 2 and 2' are inherited by the beliefs constructed in
the elaborations.
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